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Limits of Dodd-Frank's Rating
Agency Reform
ClaireA. Hill*
INTRODUCTION

The history of rating agency reform has not been inspiring.
Until recently, it seemed stuck in an ever-repeating cycle of
futility. A crisis would spur calls for reform, hearings would be
conducted, the SEC would issue proposals and requests for
comments, and ultimately, nothing would happen-until the next
crisis, when the cycle would begin again. The Enron debacle, in
which the rating agencies rated Enron's debt investment grade
until four days before Enron declared bankruptcy, I did spur some
action, including federal legislation and SEC regulations.2
Whatever else may be said about the Enron-spurred action, it
failed to prevent rating agencies from rating low-quality
securities as AAA. This misrating was an important cause of the
recent financial crisis.3
In response to the crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank")4 was
passed. Dodd-Frank includes some reforms to the rating agency
regulatory regime. In this article, I argue that while DoddFrank's rating agency reforms are not bad, they also are not
particularly good. They do not sufficiently address the core
reasons why rating agencies gave such inflated ratings to
subprime securities or why the agencies so grievously misrated
* Professor, Solly Robins Distinguished Research Fellow, and Director, Institute for
Law & Rationality, University of Minnesota. Thanks to participants at the Chapman
University School of Law symposium, "From Wall Street to Main Street: The Future of
Financial Regulation."
i See Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before S.
Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Enron Hearings] (statement of
Sen. Joseph Lieberman, Chairman, S. Comm. on Gov't Affairs), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate-hearings&docid=
f:79888.pdf.
2 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xxv (2011),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/feic/fcic.pdf.
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

133

134

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:1

other instruments, including Enron debt and debt involved in the
Asian flu. I then explain the reasons for this conclusion, and
make some suggestions for better rating agency reform.
I. WHY HAVE THE RATING AGENCIES FAILED?

A.

Two (Extreme?) Possibilities
Rating agencies have often been right in their ratings.
Sometimes, however, they have been wrong, even spectacularly
wrong. Why have they sometimes been so wrong? Consider the
following two possibilities. The first is that the rating agencies
are less than cutting-edge in their capabilities. Because of their
privileged positions-thanks to government favoritism and
market norms effectively requiring their use, something I will
explain more in Part 11-they have not had to fear large losses of
market share. Because credit ratings agencies have not needed
to compete vigorously on quality, they have not sought to excel;
instead (in the more charitable version of this explanation) they
have simply maintained some minimal level of competence.
Rating agencies therefore have not needed to be very
sophisticated in their financial analyses; they also have not
needed to be particularly good at ferreting out fraud.5
The second possibility as to why rating agencies have been so
wrong at times is that they are corrupt. Because the agencies
are paid by the issuers and the issuers can threaten to take their
business elsewhere if they cannot get high ratings, the rating
agencies have let themselves be bribed into giving high ratings
even when such ratings are not warranted.6
Many rating agency critics writing before the recent
financial crisis seemed to believe the first explanation. Critics
writing since the crisis seem to believe the second.
i. Before the Recent Financial Crisis
Notable rating agency fiascos before 2008 include: Enron
(corporation's extensive use of financial "techniques" that created
a wholly false financial appearance), Orange County (ill-advised
bets on interest rates using complex derivatives by county
Treasurer Robert Citron, leading to bankruptcy), the Asian Flu
(a cascade of recessions in the region leading to massive
downgrading), Washington Public Power Supply System
("WPPSS," pronounced "Whoops") (cost overruns and other
5 See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 78-81
(2004) [hereinafter Hill, Regulating].
6 See Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime
Securities, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585, 593-96 (2010) [hereinafter Hill, Bad Job].
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complicating factors led to default on bonds originally rated
AAA),7 and National Century Financial Enterprises (bankruptcy
after lying executives "deceive[d] investors and rating agencies
about the financial health of NCFE and how investors' money
would be used")8.
Following are some criticisms of the rating agencies in these
debacles attributing the bad rating agency performance to
incompetence:
As to Enron: Joseph Lieberman, then-Chairman of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, said:
[T]he credit rating agencies were dismally lax in their coverage of
Enron. They didn't ask probing questions and generally accepted at
face value whatever Enron officials chose to tell them. And while they
claim to rely primarily on public filings with the SEC, analysts from
Standard and Poor's not only did not read Enron's proxy statement,
they didn't even know what information they might contain. 9

Approximately one year after Enron, one commentator said:
"[t]he rating agencies display the classic characteristics of an
entrenched cartel. . . [t]hey're lazy, unresponsive, and ultimately

unhelpful. They tend to play catch-up, downgrading ratings only
after financial weaknesses are revealed or ferreted out by more
enterprising researchers." 10
As to Orange County, Betsy Dotson, an assistant director
with the Government Finance Officers Association said: "[m]any
of our members have called us wondering where the rating
agencies were.

It's a logical question . . ..

Some of these losses

may have been avoided if the rating agencies had spotted
problems earlier.""1 Christopher Cox, then a U.S. Representative
(and later SEC Commissioner), said: "[h]ow is it that the rating
agencies, the SEC, the entire market, was unable to learn about
what [Robert ] Citron was doing?" 12

7 See Claire A. Hill, Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies After Enron?, 4
J. Bus. TECH. L. 283, 291-92 (2009).
8 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Former National Century
Financial Enterprises CEO Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison, Co-Owner Sentenced to 25
Years in Prison for Conspiracy, Fraud and Money Laundering (Mar. 27, 2009), available
at http://www.fbi.gov/cincinnati/press-releases/2009/ci032709.htm; see also id.
9 Press Statement of Chairman Joseph Lieberman, Financial Oversight of Enron:
The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs, COMM. ON GOVT AFFAIRS (Oct. 7, 2002),
http://hsgac.senate.gov/publiclarchive/100702press.htm.
lo Daniel Gross, Bust Up the Ratings Cartel, SLATE (Dec. 23, 2002, 1:27 PM),
http://www.slate.comlid/2075959/.
11 Debora Vrana, Bond Investors Question Abilities of Credit-Rating Services in
9
Debacle, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at Dl, available at http://articles.1atimes.com/19 4-1208/business/fi-6631_1_orange-county-s-bankruptcy.
12 Gebe Martinez, Cox Wonders How Citron Got Past SEC, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995,
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As to the Asian flu, one common critique was that the rating
agencies were caught unaware (or, as one article memorably
said, "with their pants down.")13 In the same vein is this critique
of the rating agencies made in the aftermath of the WPPSS
debacle: Moody's Investors Service "simply did not recognize that
credit analysis in this new situation required looking upstream to
the impact on the venture's sponsors."14
ii. Since the Financial Crisis Began
A stark contrast exists between the foregoing picture of
rating agencies as hapless dunces and the picture painted of
their behavior rating subprime mortgage securities, the
securities whose decline in value precipitated the financial crisis.
A critical fact is that most rating agencies, including Moody's,
Standard & Poor's, and Fitch Ratings (sometimes colloquially
known as the "Big Three"), are paid by the issuers whose
securities they rate, creating a conflict of interest.15 A search on
Google.com for "rating agency conflict of interest" on April 11,
2011 yielded approximately

688,000 hits.16

Paul Krugman

apparently subscribes to this view. He wrote a column entitled
"Berating The Raters" in which he says, "[c]learly the rating
agencies skewed their assessments to please their clients."17
Joseph Stiglitz also emphasizes rating agency conflicts. Stiglitz
noted that
[t]he incentive structure of the rating agencies also proved perverse.
Agencies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's are paid by the very
people they are supposed to grade. As a result, they've had every
reason to give companies high ratings, in a financial version of what
18
college professors know as grade inflation.

at BI, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1995-02-22/locallme-34793-1_orangecounty-investment.
13 Rating Agencies Caught With Their Pants Down, EUROMONEY, Jan. 15, 1998, at
51; see also G. Ferri, L.-G. Liu & J. E. Stiglitz, The ProcyclicalRole of Rating Agencies:
Evidence from the East Asian Crisis, 28 EcON. NOTES 335, 337 (1999) ("Credit rating

agencies were caught by surprise by the East Asian crisis.").
14 Willard T. Carleton, Brian Dragun & Victoria Lazear, The WPPSS Mess, or
"What's in a Bond Rating?"-A Case Study, 2 INT'L REV. OF FIN. ANALYSIS 1, 14 (1993).
15 See Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at 44, 50. Historically, some agencies were
paid by their subscribers, but that business model became more difficult when copying

machines became readily available. Id.
conflict of interest," GOOGLE,
of "rating agency
query
16 Search
http://www.google.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2011); see also Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at
593 (finding 274,000 hits as of 2010).
17 Paul Krugman, Berating the Raters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A23, available

at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/opinion/26krugman.html?dbk.
is Joseph E. Stiglitz, CapitalistFools, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2009, at 48, 51.
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Former employees of rating agencies, especially Moody's,
have given powerful testimony blaming the misratings involved
in the financial crisis on this conflict of interest. One Moody's
employee, Eric Kolchinsky, testified that
[i]n my opinion, the cause of the financial crisis lies primarily with the
misaligned incentives in the financial system. Individuals across the
financial food chain, from the mortgage broker to the CDO banker,
The
were compensated based on quantity rather than quality.
situation was no different at the rating agencies. 19

B.

The (Obvious) Third Possibility
The foregoing indicates an interesting, and largely
unnoticed, shift in the reasons given by commentators as to why
rating agencies have sometimes spectacularly misrated. Are
I have argued
rating agencies dunces, corrupt, or both?
elsewhere that the agencies are neither, although both their
quality and independence need significant improvement. As to
the former, I argued that the agencies were not cutting-edge,
given that they didn't have to compete vigorously for business.20
I have disputed, though, the argument that their ratings provide
no information whatsoever-that the agencies are complete
Government favoritism and established market
dunces.21
practices allowed rating agencies to be slackers (and/or dunces),
but only up to a point. Past that point, markets, and probably
government, would have intervened.
I have also argued that the agencies were generally not
Rather, they engaged in
wholly self-consciously corrupt.
considerable self-deception and reckless, if not willful, blindness,
similar to the self-deception practiced at many investment banks
and law firms.22 Moreover, the agencies are clearly capable of
not being corrupted when they are being paid by issuers; their
ratings for plain-vanilla debt, for which they are also paid by the
issuers, are not generally considered to be compromised.23 But
there are some clear indications of corruption during the recent
financial crisis. A few former rating agency employees have
described the single-minded pursuit of market share at the
i1 Wall Street and the FinancialCrisis: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs,

111th Cong. 14 (2011) (statement of Eric Kolchinsky, former Team Managing Director,
Service), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRGMoody's Investors
111shrg57321/pdflCHRG-111shrg57321.pdf.
20 See Hill, Regulating, supranote 5, at 72-81; Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 600.
21 Hill, Regulating,supra note 5, at 72.
22 See Claire A. Hill, Who Were the Villains in the Subprime Crisis, and Why It
Matters, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 323, 340-42 (2010).
23 See Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 595.
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expense of credit quality.24 One notorious incident discussed
below concerns Moody's' discovery that it had mistakenly applied
its rating model so as to give too high a rating to a particular
type of instrument.25 Moody's' response was to change the model
so that the instruments would continue to have a high rating.26
What accounts for the increasing perception and, to some
extent, reality, of greater corruption in rating agencies postEnron? Very simply, that there was a much higher payoff to
being corrupt (or self-deceiving, or recklessly or willfully blind)
than had previously been the case, and a higher cost to not being
so. This is because rating agencies began to compete with one
another for business. Previously, the government favoritism and
market norms had created what was sometimes called a "partner
monopoly" with Moody's and Standard & Poor's as the
partners. 27
Another agency, Fitch, gradually became an
acceptable alternative.28 Thus, an issuer's threat to take its
business elsewhere became a credible one.
Moreover, the amount of business at issue is near-infinite.
The ratings business originally involved rating debt securities for
companies that wanted to raise money and found it worthwhile
to do so. A "natural" and fairly low limit of such issuances thus
exists. By contrast, structured finance securities are made up of
other instruments; structuring the securities is itself a business
entered into for profit. There is thus incentive and ability to
structure more such instruments.
The raw materials-the
underlying instruments-originally were needed.
But as
structuring technology and investor appetites got more
sophisticated, the need for raw materials ceased to be much of a
constraint. Securitization securities could be crafted out of other
securitization securities ("collateralized debt obligations cubed,"
or CDO 3s) and they could be "synthetics," comprised of bets
tracking the performance of "real" instruments. Thus, the only
"natural" limit to the structure of securities was investors'
appetites, and investors proved voracious indeed.

24 Krugman, supra note 17, at A23; Statement and Testimony by Eric Kolchinsky
Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM. 1-3
(June 2, 2010), http://feic-static.law.stanford.edulcdn-medialfeic-testimony/2010-0602Kolchinsky.pdf- Testimony of Mark Froeba Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM. 3-4 (June 2, 2010), http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdnmedia/fcic-testimony/2010-0602-Froeba.pdf
[hereinafter
Froeba Statement].
25 Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 591.
26 See id. at 593.
27 See infra Part II.
28 Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 587 n.4 & 590 n.15.
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II. SOME INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Some institutional background is in order. Who are these
rating agencies that benefitted from government favoritism, and
that are favored by markets? Why are there so few of them?
What form did the government favoritism take? What effect did
the reforms adopted in response to the Enron debacle have?
Below, I briefly discuss some answers to these questions.
The ratings agencies at issue, the Big Three, are Standard &
Poor's, Moody's Investors Service, and, to a lesser extent, Fitch
Ratings. Standard & Poor's and Moody's both date back to the
early 1900s. 2 9 They have had the vast bulk of the rating agency
Fitch has existed for a
market for a very long time.30
considerable length of time as well, and is an amalgam of several
smaller rating agencies.31 Over the years, Fitch has increased its
prominence, especially in the area of structured finance
securities, the type of securities involved in the financial crisis.32
Markets have expected issuers to get ratings for their securities
from both Standard & Poor's and Moody's (or, in the case of some
structured finance securities, one rating from Moody's or
Standard & Poor's and the other from Fitch); this expectation
apparently may translate into lower buyer valuations for
securities issued without their ratings.33
Government favoritism is shorthand for two things that,
especially in tandem, have contributed to the continuing
dominance of Moody's and Standard & Poor's and more recently,
Fitch. One is that since 1931, the government has required or
encouraged certain types of investors to prefer financial
instruments that rating agencies rate highly.34 The other is that
in 1975, the SEC began designating particular rating agencies as
"Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations," or
"NRSROs."35 The government's requirement or encouragement
that some investors buy highly rated instruments became a
requirement or encouragement that such investors buy
instruments rated highly by an NRSRO.36 There were no set
procedures to become an NRSRO.37 Very few agencies were
29 Hill, Regulating,supra note 5, at 46-47.
30 Id. at 47.
31 Id. at 46-47.

32 See Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 587 n.4 & 590 n.15.
33 See Hill, Regulating,supra note 5, at 47 n.17 and accompanying text. For more on
Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and the two-ratings norm, see id. at 59-62. Despite the tworatings norm, there are some areas in which the agencies did compete. See id. at 63.
34 See id. at 53.
35 Id. at 53-54.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 54.

ChapmanLaw Review

140

[Vol. 15:1

accepted; the SEC noted that not many applied.38 Prominent
among those accepted were Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and
Fitch. 39
Certainly, the process to obtain NRSRO designation was
opaque at best. One applicant, LACE Financial, noted that it
was only contacted twice by the SEC: once to say its application
had been received, and again, eight years later, to say the
application had been denied.40 Another disappointed applicant,
Egan-Jones, reported being told by the SEC that the SEC did not
want to reveal the criteria for becoming an NRSRO, lest the
applicant find a way to meet them.41
Why do so few rating agencies have the vast bulk of the
market?
Many blame the government and the NRSRO
designation process for this state of affairs.42 I have argued
elsewhere that the dynamic is more complicated.43 It is not as
though the only agencies receiving the NRSRO designation were
Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. Issuers could have used
other NRSROs, but they typically did not. Moreover, even when
regulations only required the use of one agency, issuers might
use two. 4 4 A newspaper article written in 2004 noted that
"[i]nvestors expect ratings from Moody's and S&P, each of which
controls about 40 percent of the market."45 The article quoted
Dessa Bokides, a former Wall Street banker as saying, "[y]ou
basically have to go to Moody's and S&P .... The market doesn't
accept it if you don't go to both of them."46 Moody's and Standard
& Poor's were the market anointed raters; Fitch made some
inroads, especially in structured finance. Nobody had both the
will and the way to change this state of affairs. But why two,
and why these two? Why was Fitch (and not one or more other
agencies) able to make inroads when it did? Nobody has a good
answer to these questions, but it is clear that the norms at issue
are sticky indeed.
One reason why the rating agency industry is as
concentrated as it is may be the difficulty with business
strategies that would-be competitors might use. Competing on
3s Id. at 54 n.60.
39 Id. at 59.

40 Id. at 55 n.61.
41 Id. at 54-55.
42 Id. at 62.

43 Id. at 59-64.
44 Id. at 66.

45 Alec Klein, Smoothing the Way for Debt Markets: Firms' Influence Has Grown
Along With World's Reliance on Bonds, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2004, at A18, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5573-2004Nov22.html.
46 Id.
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price is not apt to lure issuers; after all, the ones making the
decisions are not bearing the costs themselves. Any benefits
issuers might enjoy from saving their companies money would be
significantly outweighed by the reputational and financial costs
their companies would bear if an issuance were not well-accepted
by the markets. Competing on laxity is the more obvious
strategy, but it is self-defeating if done too nakedly; the new
agency cannot be seen by markets to be easily bribed. Thus, the
rating agency needs some credible reason for its apparent laxity.
The obvious reason that springs to mind is greater "expertise."
This is by some accounts precisely what Fitch did to become the
third ranked agency, especially in structured finance.47
However, Fitch still had to fight perceptions that it was more lax
than Moody's and Standard & Poor's, and it developed and
carried out a strategy to do so. 4 8
So, it is perhaps not surprising that the rating agency
industry has been concentrated, with very little competition. The
concentration had its costs, but it may also have had an
important benefit. As an article on WPPSS notes:
[t]hese alumni [of the rating agencies who claim that there were
insiders who wanted to downgrade WPPSS] are quick to allege a
reason for the rating agencies' restraint: they are rating their
clients .

. .

.

Whoops, for example, has paid the two agencies more

than $400,000 over the past ten years. But since marketing a big
bond issue without agency ratings would be unthinkable, it's not clear
49
that paying even substantial fees can buy issuers the upper hand.

Indeed, one important issue flagged in the Enron debacle
was the extent to which the accounting firm Arthur Andersen felt
it had to do its client's bidding to keep the client, and was willing
to do things that were arguably dishonest as a means to that
end.50 When rating agencies misrated Enron's securities, it was
not because they were trying to keep Enron's business by helping
Enron create a false financial appearance. Rather, the picture
painted at the time was that the rating agencies were not canny
chicanerers- they were clueless. As a rating agency veteran was
quoted in The Economist in 2003 as saying, "[w]e may be
incompetent . .. but we're not dishonest."51

47

Id.

48 See Hill, Regulating, supranote 5, at 63-64.
49 Peter Brimelow, Shock Waves from Whoops Roll East, FORTUNE, July 25, 1983, at

46-47.
5o Daniel
Kadlec, Enron: Who's Accountable?, TIME (Jan. 13,
2002),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,193520,00.html;
see
also
Hill,
Regulating, supra note 5, at 91.
51 Exclusion Zone, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003, at 65. That rating agencies were

completely non-conflicted surely overstates the case; still, they were far less conflicted
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That was then. What about now? The Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006 requires the SEC to award NRSRO
designations for applicants who meet specified criteria.52 The
Act also requires increased disclosure and oversight.53 The Act
did not prevent rating agencies from disastrously misrating
subprime mortgage securities. It has led to the designation of
more NRSROs, including LACE Financial and Egan-Jones.54 By
the time the Act was passed, Fitch was becoming a more
plausible second (that is, additional) rater than it previously had
been, especially in the structured finance arena.5 5 Issuers began
to play agencies against each other, now being able to threaten
credibly (unlike when there had been a partner monopoly
consisting of Moody's and Standard & Poor's) that they might
take their business elsewhere. Might the two developments be
linked? It seems possible, although it also seems possible that
Fitch, having marketed itself as a particular expert in structured
finance simply succeeded in doing what it had set out to do.56
Whatever the cause, the effect is clear and disastrous. Former
Moody's employee Mark Froeba described the shift in culture at
Moody's. According to Froeba, a culture of integrity was replaced

than Arthur Andersen, and certainly, less than they later became once the norm of
obtaining both Moody's and Standard & Poor's ratings eroded for subprime securities, and
issuers could play both of these agencies off against each other and Fitch.
52 Credit Agency Rating Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4, 120 Stat. 1327,
1329-38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). An impetus for the 2006
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act was apparently lobbying by the "small but vocal"
agency Egan-Jones. HERWIG LANGOHR & PATRICIA LANGOHR, THE RATING AGENCIES AND
THEIR CREDIT RATINGS 403 (2008).

53 Credit Agency Rating Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4, 120 Stat. 1327,
1329-38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
54 See Credit Rating Agencies-NRSROs, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
nrsro.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). Interestingly, in August of 2010, LACE Financial,
was acquired by Julius Kroll, known as a corporate "sleuth." See Aaron Lucchetti
& Jeannette Neumann, Kroll Gets A License To Shoot (Bonds), WALL ST. J.,
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
available
C1,
at
2010,
31,
Aug.
Given that one reason
SB10001424052748704323704575462040422537232.html.
Standard & Poor's and Moody's executives gave for not being able to do a better job rating
Enron's debt is that they are not experts at looking for fraud, perhaps Kroll can craft a
market niche in doing precisely that. See Enron Hearings, supra note 1, at 7-9. Another
newly designated NRSRO, Realpoint, was bought in May 2010 by Morningstar, a "leading
Morningstar, Inc.
See
research."
investment
independent
of
provider
2010),
(May 3,
Completes Acquisition of Realpoint, LLC, MORNINGSTAR
http://corporate.morningstar.comlUS/asp/subject.aspxfilter=PR4498&xmlfile=174.xml. It
should be noted that over the years, before the 2006 Act effectively required the SEC to
designate more NRSROs, the SEC had designated agencies other than Moody's, Standard
& Poor's, and Fitch, but those three agencies ended up buying the other designees. See
Hill, Regulating,supra note 5, at 54.
55 See Fitch Releases U.S. Structured Finance Rating Comparability Study,
Bus. WIRE (Mar. 24, 2006), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20060324005359/en/
Fitch-Releases-U.S.-Structured-Finance-Rating-Comparability.
56 See Hill, Regulating,supra note 5, at 63-64.
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by a culture that single-mindedly pursued market share.57
Inaccurate ratings were a foreseeable result. In testimony before
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Froeba stated:
I have tried to show that Moody's managers deliberately engineered a
change to its culture intended to ensure that rating analysis never
jeopardized market share and revenue. They accomplished this both
by rewarding those who collaborated and punishing those who
resisted. In addition to intimidating analysts who did not embrace
the new values, they also emboldened bankers to resist Moody's
analysts if doing so was good for Moody's business. Finally, I have
tried to provide you with an example of the extent to which the new
culture corrupted the rating process. The adjusted European CLO
Rating Factor Table appears to have been adopted for the sole purpose
of preserving Moody's European CLO market share despite the fact
that it might have resulted in Moody's assigning ratings that were
58
wrong by as much as one and a half to two notches.

III. DODD-FRANK AND THE GOALS OF RATING AGENCY REFORM:
RETURNING TO THE STORIES OF DUNCES AND CORRUPTION

Dodd-Frank's rating agency reform was enacted in response
to the rating agencies' disastrous misrating of subprime
securities.59 The reform has two important goals.60 One is to
decrease reliance on ratings.61 Notwithstanding what is often
said, the problem is not simply that the rating agencies' ratings
were too high. Rather, it is that people invested on the strength
of those ratings. We would not need to care what rating agencies
did (or how badly they rated) if nobody listened to them. The
other goal is to improve the quality of ratings.62 The drafters of
Dodd-Frank presumably recognized that people will continue to
be influenced by the agencies, at least in the short- to moderateterm, no matter what the government does. If rating agencies
will be influential for some time to come, it behooves government
to make them better if at all possible.
How does Dodd-Frank try to achieve these aims? As to the
first aim, elimination of reliance on the agencies, it mandates the
elimination of references in statutes and regulations to
NRSROs.63 Something else is to replace these references.64 The
57 Froeba Statement, supra note 24, at 4-5.

s Id. at 19.
59 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 931, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010).

§§ 931-939A.
§ 939A.
62 See § 932 (requiring that, for example, NSRSOs establish internal controls over
60 See, e.g.,

61

See

processes for determining credit ratings).
63 See
64

Id.

§ 939.
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rationale behind the new law is simple and unassailable. The
government has many reasons to care about the quality of
financial instruments and firms that hold them; it therefore
needs a measure of quality. It has used ratings, but they proved
spectacularly unreliable. The problem is that there is no ready
alternative. Moreover, the market norms of using ratings from
rating agencies-indeed, particular rating agencies-will not
disappear even if the statutory and regulatory references are
removed. Market practices are sticky, and market actors have
strong incentives to abide by them. Even now, after Moody's,
Standard & Poor's, and Fitch have done so badly, and when other
rating agencies are NRSROs, the Big Three are still highly
As the title of an article published when the
influential.
agencies' misratings should have been fresh in investors' minds
indicates, In Rating Agencies, Investors Still Trust.65 All this
suggests that at least in the short term and perhaps for the
moderate term as well, reliance on NRSRO ratings and in
particular, the Big Three's ratings, will continue.
As to the second aim, improving the quality of ratings, DoddFrank has a multifaceted approach.
For rating agencies, it provides for:
(1) expanded procedures to deal with conflicts of interest66
(2) more independence in their corporate governance 6 7
(3) greater internal controls68
(4) more expansive and accessible disclosure of ratings and
the basis for ratings69
(5) increased accountability and liability7o
(6) a duty to blow the whistle on lawbreaking7l
Dodd-Frank also provides for more SEC oversight and
monitoring of rating agencies.72

65 David Gillen, In Rating Agencies Investors Still Trust, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2009, at Bi, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/business/economy/
05place.html?dlbk.
66 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 932, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872-84 (2010).
67 In this regard, section 932(t) requires that at least one half, but not fewer than
two, of an NRSRO's board of directors be independent of the NSRSO, including a
definition of independence.
68 § 932(a)(2)(B)(3).
69 § 932.
70 §§ 932(a)(1), (2), (3); §933; § 939G.
71 § 934.
72 § 932.
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Will Dodd-Frank succeed in improving rating agency
quality? To appraise its prospects for doing so, let us consider
again why rating agencies have grossly misrated. I argued above
that while some corruption existed, there was also a clientoriented perspective that many have (in my view, mistakenly)
characterized as corruption. That perspective was borne of a
broader lack of a competitive edge. A true competitive edge
would have kept agencies more receptive to receiving
disconfirming evidence-evidence that many instruments for
which their clients sought high ratings were really junk.
Insofar as we think rating agencies are corrupt, or somewhat
so, most of the Dodd-Frank reforms listed above may actually do
a better job perfecting concealment than improving quality.
Dodd-Frank does not ask rating agencies to guarantee results,
only processes. 73 Many skilled and well-meaning professionals
are in the business of helping companies document that they are
using appropriate processes. It may be harder to do so if the
companies are in fact corrupt than if they are not, but it is
presumably not impossible. If a corrupt company is trying to
hide its corruption, it may be able to do so even from prying eyes
of bureaucrats and litigants. And if a company has convinced
itself that it is behaving appropriately, there is even less to hide.
Moreover, while the corrupt agency will be better at hiding what
it does, the more honest yet more incompetent agency may fool
bureaucrats too; bureaucrats' monitoring is scarcely cutting-edge,
and may catch only egregious errors. The truly incompetent
agency may be caught: it may also be incompetent in hiding its
non-compliance with regulatory requirements. But by the time a
lawsuit is initiated, significant losses may already have been
suffered.
But what about the expanded procedures to deal with
conflicts of interest and the increased role of independent board
members? Here, again, there are several reasons to be wary.
These types of approaches have been used before for
Certainly,
corporations, without significant positive effect.
increased independence on corporate boards has scarcely been a
panacea; 74 the type of independence that is needed is
independent-mindedness, not independence as it is formally

73 Some commentators have proposed that agencies should get financial rewards for
accurate ratings and financial punishments for inaccurate ratings. In my view, such
proposals have insurmountable difficulties. See Hill, Bad Job, supra note 6, at 606 n.58
and accompanying text.
74 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between
Board Composition and Firm Performance,54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999).
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defined.75 Whether a rating agency is (mostly or somewhat)
corrupt, less than cutting-edge, or both, it will certainly be able
and inclined to use processes that pass muster given the level of
scrutiny even a highly technically sophisticated board member is
apt to use. It seems unlikely that a highly corrupt agency will be
unable to conceal its improprieties. It also seems unlikely that
an agency simply engaging in self-serving self-deception would
not also manage to fool its director-monitors. Procedures to
guard against conflicts have the same types of shortcomings.
The thoroughly corrupt agency simply lies, and the self-deceiving
agency simply convinces itself all is well. The essential conflict,
that the issuer is the client, remains, no matter what formal
separations of duties and outside monitoring is mandated.
What is needed in the moderate term is vigorous
competition. But in the short term, competition has proven a
disaster. Why? Because the Big Three have "issuer pays" as
their business model. Their incentives have been to direct their
efforts (and for those who were actually corrupt, their guile) at
"accommodating" their clients, working with their clients to
achieve the desired ratings. If the agencies were simply and
straightforwardly corrupt, they might be dissuaded from this
course of action by sufficient monitoring and accountability.76 In
the likelier scenario, in which self-deception plays a significant
part, the agencies are going through the motions, guided by their
highly-paid counselors, and do not really know they are
sanitizing ultimately suspect and self-serving conclusions.
The solution is to get away from an "issuer pays" model, in
which those paying for ratings are the securities' sellers, and
return to "subscriber pays," in which ratings are paid for by
people buying research as to securities' quality77 But how?
When an issuer is issuing securities, how can a "subscriber pays"
rating be arranged? When the legislation that would become the
Dodd-Frank Act was being considered in the Senate, Al Franken
proposed an amendment that would have achieved some of the
benefits of "subscriber pays" consistent with an "issuer pays"
model in the context of ratings that have been particularly
catastrophic, those of structured finance securities such as

75 Claire A. Hill & Erin A. O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
Given the enormous difficulty, if not near-impossibility, of
1717, 1781-88 (2006).
measuring independent-mindedness, the formal definitions are used as proxies. But
there is ample reason to suppose they are not very good proxies.
76 Or maybe not. Maybe, as suggested above, they would simply direct their efforts
at concealment.
77 See Hill, Regulating, supra note 5, at n.32 & n.33 and accompanying text.
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subprime securities.78 The amendment was adopted by the
Senate, but dropped in the committee reconciliations of DoddFrank. 79
Franken's amendment would have required the
creation of a board that would select the rating agency to be used
to rate a structured finance issuance.80 The issuer would not be
able to "fire" the agency and select another.s1 It could use a
second agency as well, but it would have to contend with the first
agency's rating.
One important reason agencies are not presently competing
vigorously on quality is that market norms dictating the use of
Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch are sticky. One way to
achieve more vigorous competition is by giving Moody's,
Standard & Poor's, and Fitch viable competitors-competitors
the markets will accept. The government had a real chance in
this area. Through the Franken amendment's board, it could
have given other agencies more visibility and acceptance in the
marketplace by requiring issuers to use them. This probably
would not have led to the most vigorous possible competition on
quality, however, as there is no reason to suppose the board
would have been expert at, or even inclined to, seek the "best"
agency. But the board could and would have set minimum
standards of competence. The increment of quality beyond that
minimum increment is less important than attenuating the tie
between issuers and rating agencies, as the bill would have done.
The board contemplated by the Franken amendment may yet
come into existence, giving us a chance to test its usefulness:
Dodd-Frank requires a study into the feasibility of such a board
or a like mechanism.82
There are other optimistic scenarios, some more likely than
others. Investors might be chastened by their experiences in the
present financial crisis and become more wary of rating agency
ratings, a prospect I consider quite unlikely given that even
egregious misratings have not stopped market participants from
listening to the rating agencies (recall the New York Times
article discussed above, In Rating Agencies We Still Trust).83 The
references in the statutes and regulations to rating agency
78 See Daniel Indiviglio, Franken Amendment Would Bring Real Rating Agency
Reform, THE ATLANTIC (May 6, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.comlbusinesslarchivel2010/
05/franken-amendment-would-bring-real-rating-agency-reform/56346/.
79 See Michael Hirsh, Al Franken Gets Serious, NEWSWEEK, July 12, 2010, at 38, 40,
availableat http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/05/al-franken-gets-serious.html.
so Indiviglio, supra note 78.
81 Id.

82 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 939F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010).
83 Gillen, supra note 65, at BL.
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ratings might be replaced with references to far more accurate
measures of creditworthiness (also very unlikely-after all, if such
measures could readily be developed, they would have been
developed and in use already, certainly by market participants if
not in regulations). One scenario, perhaps more likely than
these, is that other agencies, such as Egan-Jones and now Kroll
(the agency that bought one of the post-Enron designated rating
agencies, LACE Financial, which is run by a well-known
"corporate sleuth") might, through aggressive positioning and
perhaps good track records, manage to erode the market norm of
using Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch.84 Egan-Jones and,
for some of its ratings, Kroll, are using a different business model
from that used by the Big Three, where the subscribers pay
rather than the issuers.85 And for Kroll, even where the issuer is
paying, Kroll is effectively touting its critical-mindedness and
ability to ferret out fraud-something Moody's, Standard &
Poor's, and Fitch stated was not their strength when trying to
explain and excuse their ratings of Enron.86 These are among
the optimistic scenarios. The pessimistic scenario is that history,
in the form of short investor memories and sticky market norms,
repeats itself yet again. Dodd-Frank, as enacted, does not do
enough to prevent this from occurring.

84 See Lucchetti & Neumann, supra note 54, at Cl; see James Freeman,
Editorial, Where There's Corruption, There's Opportunity, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4-5, 2010,
at
http://online.wsj.comlarticle/
A13,
available
Ed.,
at
Weekend
SB10001424052748704476104575439841537558182.html#.
85 Freeman, supra note 84, at Cl; NRSRO-Nationally Recognized StatisticalRating
Agency, EGAN-JONES, http://www.egan-jones.com/nsrso (last visited Apr. 21, 2011).
86 See, e.g., Enron Hearings, supra note 1, at 25. Ronald Barone, a Managing
Director of Standard & Poor's, explained that Enron "was not a ratings problem. It was a
fraud problem." Id.

